TCIPG

ADVANCED ASSESSMENT PITFALLS

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TRUSTWORTHY CYBER INFRASTRUCTURE FOR THE POWER GRID | TCIPG.ORG UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS | DARTMOUTH COLLEGE | UC DAVIS | WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY FUNDING SUPPORT PROVIDED BY DOE-DE AND DHS S&T

ADVANCED ASSESSMENT PITFALLS

- "Locked down" SSL
 - Client and server side certs

- Proprietary applications
 - No known public issues
- Proprietary protocols
 - What is this thing talking?
- Black boxes
 - How do you assess something that is dropped on your desk?
- Network appliances
 - A box on the network intended to do a specific function, likely not under the control of mgmt. Gold mine?
- Encryption
 - Harddrive? Communications? TPM? Let's see...
- Limited scoping/engagement
 - I can only do X, but need to do Y... how do I do this creatively through X?
- No access
 - Can't get anywhere?

"Locked down" SSL certs

- Reverse the application that is being used
 - C#: reflector.net, etc.
 - Execute portions via mono or direct Visual Studio
 - Java: JAD, JD, etc.
 - Execute directly with jruby or jython
 - Scripts: Really?
 - Other: IDA Pro, OllyDbg, oSpy, etc.
 - Read and learn
- Leverage stunnel once you have certs
- Proprietary applications
 - See above & poke and prod
 - Fuzzing
 - Bunny, skipfish, SPIKE, etc.

Proprietary protocols

- Observation, Fuzzing
 - Peach, Sulley, zzuf, mangle, etc.
- Proxying
 - Ratproxy, ZAP, arachni, etc.
- Similar to looking at an application itself

- Black boxes
 - Analyze traffic

- Firmware available somewhere?
 - Yes?
 - Profit
 - No?
 - Does the device have a firmware update mechanism? If so, trigger it.
 - Can you extract it?
- Network appliances
 - See above
 - Often not patched as quickly (or at all due to product release cycle), so might have vulnerabilities present that the rest of the organization has long since patched

- Encryption
 - Harddrive
 - Leverage older BIOS systems to clear it via hotswapping unprotected drive with protected drive
 - Steal it from memory via extended PCI interfaces (express card, firewire, thunderbolt, etc)
 - Filesystem
 - Password crackers

- Communications
 - Scour for keys, see previous reversing discussion
- Hardware
 - Hot boot a device and steal the RAM image
 - Take it apart and extract information
 - Remember, anything for storage may have latent footprints of what was there at some point

- Limited scoping/engagement
 - Think outside of the box

- What non-obvious item can be abused in a way that benefits you
 - Find a javascript inject, inject a javascript trojan that helps accomplish your goal
 - » And then wait for it to be triggered

- No access
 - Search for WiFi (and crack it)

- Deliver a package and plug your obscured device into an available ethernet port on the way
 - Ever see a computer that matches the faceplate of an ethernet jack? I've made one.
- Drop a USB key, iPod, etc. in the doorway and make them have a special payload
- Ship a trojan'd mouse to a secretary of someone important
- Cause a disruption to result in a response action that benefits you
 - Fire alarm? Car alarms outside? Take over the video system and display a strange clip?
 - Network outage due to ARP related issue, MAC/IP conflict with internal router interface, etc.
- Be someone else and know your targets
 - Social engineering
 - Social engagements (company parties, the local bar hotspot)
- If allowed, steal the target device

HOW TO PROTECT YOUR SYSTEMS

Pay attention to details

- The lack of which is what attackers exploit
- Secure your physical access
- Be careful about what you say
- ACTIVELY monitor for changes on your infrastructure
- Patch widely and push your vendors to patch as well
 - You must know/determine details about those proprietary boxes in terms of external exposure
- Process!
 - Penetration is only part of the game, the process of how you address attacks (actively or post-event) is just as critical



SOME EXAMPLES

EMBEDDED DEVICE AUDIT

- Strengths
 - Strong architecture
 - Decent security deployed on central systems
 - Decent security precautions on edge devices
- Weaknesses (to explore)
 - Roll your own crypto
 - Process
 - Access control
 - Development environment

HARDWARE AUTHENTICATION TOKEN & CLIENT

- Strengths
 - Leverages standards

- Relatively decent protocol and architecture model
- Weaknesses (OSX)
 - Encryption is a checkbox away from being disabled
 - Upgrade scripts call out to a web host to get updates and then process an update.sh on the system
 - Interfacing with applications is done via modifiable javascript
 - Software compiled with verbose debugging enabled, exposing (trivially) much of what the application does behind the curtain



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QUESTIONS?