Power Grid Impacts Resulting From Unintentional Demand Response
The emerging "smart grid" will enable the increased use of digital technology to improve reliability, security, and efficiency of the electric power system: from large generation, through the delivery systems to electricity consumers and a growing number of advanced distributed energy resource applications. A valuable smart grid feature is the ability to curtail load through demand response. Another application will be the ability to disconnect or reconnect service to individual meters. One of the unintended consequences being postulated is the unintended or malicious mis-operation of either demand response or customer connection. The concern is simultaneous operation in large numbers could create a disruption to the reliability and integrity of the bulk electric power system. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory conduct detailed analysis for the U.S. Department of Energy using electric power grid simulation software to quantify the impact to the electric power grid based on various hypothetical scenarios of load manipulation. Jeff Dagle will summarize the results of this study, in addition to discussing other aspects of smart grid security and energy resilience.
Jeff Dagle has worked at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, operated by Battelle for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), since 1989 and currently manages several projects in the areas of transmission reliability and security, including the North American SynchroPhasor Initiative (NASPI) and cyber security reviews for the DOE Smart Grid Investment Grants and Smart Grid Demonstration Projects associated with the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. He is a Senior Member of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), a member of the International Society of Automation (ISA) and National Society of Professional Engineers (NSPE), and is a licensed Professional Engineer in the State of Washington. He received the 2001 Tri-City Engineer of the Year award by the Washington Society of Professional Engineers, led the data requests and management task for the U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force investigation of the August 14, 2003 blackout, supported the DOE Infrastructure Security and Energy Restoration Division with on-site assessments in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina in fall 2005, and is the recipient of two patents, a Federal Laboratory Consortium (FLC) Award in 2007, and an R&D 100 Award in 2008 for the Grid Friendly™ Appliance Controller technology. Mr. Dagle was a member of a National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) study group formed in 2010 to establish critical infrastructure resilience goals. He received B.S. and M.S. degrees in Electrical Engineering from Washington State University in 1989 and 1994, respectively.
The seminar series is presented by the Trustworthy Cyber Infrastructure for the Power Grid (TCIPG) Project, an $18 million multi-university research effort whose partner institutions include the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Arizona State University, Dartmouth, and Washington State University. The TCIPG Project, a successor to the earlier NSF-funded TCIP Center, was founded in 2009 with support from the U.S. Department of Energy and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. It is housed in the Information Trust Institute, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.