


GOALS

- Conventional wisdom says use X.509 PKI in the smart grid. Our goal is to use simulation to look for potential bottlenecks in this trust infrastructure.
- On the transmission side:
 - Real-time is critical.
 - X.509 didn't work on BGP with only 30k nodes.
 - Transmission side may have 100k in the U.S. alone.
- On the consumer side:
 - Revocation will be necessary.
 - But this didn't work with SSL servers, for which there are only 1 million correctly certified nodes worldwide.
 - There may be 1 billion consumer-side nodes in the U.S.
 - And there may need to be attribute certificates; that has never been done before at the scale of the smart grid.

FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS/CHALLENGES

- Previous PKI deployments (all deployed on a much smaller scale than the envisioned smart grid PKI) have revealed several practical challenges/costs.
 - Path discovery.
 - Revocation: The number of revoked certificates was orders of magnitude larger than expected in many previous real-world PKI deployments. Will keeping Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) be feasible?
- How will the costs scale?
- What other hidden costs might there be with a much larger PKI, and with the smart grid's needs and constraints?
 - Nonstatic entities: Certificates are generally issued to a relatively static entity. In the power grid, meters need to be replaced, customers change providers, and ownership of appliances changes. What design and performance trade-offs are needed for the PKI to support this?
 - Grid speed and capacity: Meters pass data through a variety of networks, but will all of the pipes be big and reliable enough for PKI? Are there security vs. capacity trade-offs?
 - Data aggregation: Data may be aggregated at many levels. What design and performance trade-offs are needed for the PKI to support integrity checking across aggregation?




RESEARCH PLAN

- Build tool to simulate PKI in large smart grid deployments.
- Use the simulation to measure performance costs for various proposed PKI designs, grid communication topologies, and usage scenarios.

RESEARCH RESULTS

- Last year, Tucker Ward created the GCS: AMI-side smart grid PKI simulation in the NS3 framework.

- Supports simulation of a network with a star topology.



- Simulation protocols: reports sent every 15 minutes or 6 hours initiate most communication; random certificate revocation is done; cryptography, signing, and root verification are handled by adding constant time.
- Collects data on average peak bandwidth usage, average peak latency, revocation list size, average peak PKI computational cost, average peak memory cost, and PCAP of all packets sent within simulation.
- Networks simulated can be arbitrarily large but are confined to defined topologies.
- Can easily be modified to meet alternative topologies, protocols, and parameter constants.

T. Ward. *Grid Cryptographic Simulation: A Simulator to Evaluate the X.509 Standard in the Smart Grid*. Senior High Honors Thesis. Dartmouth Computer Science (www.cs.dartmouth.edu/reports/abstracts/TR2013-742/)

BROADER IMPACT


- We can quantify the costs of deploying PKI in the smart grid and use the data to mitigate bottlenecks and other problems.
- Our tool can also extend to other large systems requiring trust infrastructure.

INTERACTION WITH OTHER PROJECTS

- Builds on previous PKI simulation work by David Nicol (UIUC), Meiyuan Zhao (now at Intel), and Smith.

FUTURE EFFORTS

- Now that we've built the tool, we will be using it to explore trust infrastructure bottlenecks for various smart grid visions.
 - Investigate the network topologies of the envisioned smart grid, and the flow and volume of communication across these topologies.
 - Extend tool to investigate the potential role of attribute certificates in a smart grid PKI deployment.



- Use the findings from these investigations to run realistic simulations on GCS.
- Use the results of the simulations to draw conclusions about the deployment and use of cryptographic systems in the smart grid.