



TCIPG

TRUSTWORTHY CYBER INFRASTRUCTURE FOR THE POWER GRID | TCIPG.ORG

SMART BUILDINGS IN THE SMART GRID


JIANGMENG ZHANG

TIM YARDLEY

OUTLINE

- What are the smart grid and smart buildings?
- Within the Buildings
 - Structure and research topics
 - Cyber security concerns
- Interface to the Grid
 - Structure
 - Cyber security concerns

SMART GRID

Conceptual Model


source: Smart Grid Roadmap by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

SMART GRID

- The term “Smart Grid” refers to a modernization of the electricity delivery system so it monitors, protects and automatically optimizes the operation of its interconnected elements
 - from the central and distributed generator through the high-voltage network and distribution system, *to industrial users and building automation systems, to energy storage installations and to end-use consumers and their thermostats, electric vehicles, appliances and other household devices.*
- The Smart Grid will be characterized by *a two-way flow of electricity and information* to create an automated, widely distributed energy delivery network.

source: Smart Grid Roadmap by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

SMART BUILDING



Smart buildings:


- Self-configuring, self-commissioning, and self-learning
- Optimize operation and maximize energy savings
- Participate in transactions *within/between buildings, and with*

Energy savings from

- Commercial/Residential building automation (small/medium size)
- Advanced controllers in new refrigeration systems
- Demand control ventilation
- Predictive thermostats in homes

SMART BUILDING

A Smart Grid Needs Smart Buildings



Google

\$3.2B
Jan. 2014

nest

\$555M
Jun. 2014

dropcam



Mission: Reinvent important products for energy-efficient homes



Sensor-driven/Wi-Fi-enabled /learning thermostat



Smoke/carbon monoxide detector



Impact: Saved Southern CA customers an average of 11.3% of AC-related energy usage



WITHIN THE BUILDING


- Sensors and Controls
- Building Management System (BMS)
(lighting, temperature control)
- Elevator Controls
- Security Feeds
- Smart Meters

- ... Security where? Protecting how?

SENSING AND CONTROLS

Data analytics:

regression/classification/
clustering
energy disaggregation



Sensing:


Occupancy
Motion
Temperature
Humidity
CO2
Load

Control & optimization:


Adaptive control (MPC)
Robust/Stochastic Opt.

BUILDING MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

Traditional




Smart




* BMS = Building Management System

REVISITING

A Smart Grid Needs Smart Buildings





INTERFACE TO THE SMART GRID


- Internet of Things (IoT) Big Picture
 - Industry experts predict: the number of connected devices for the IoT will surpass 15 billion nodes by 2015 and reach over 50 billion by 2020.
 - Smart electricity grids that adjust rates for peak energy usage: savings of \$200 billion to \$500 billion per year by 2025 (McKinsey report).
- Improve the grid reliability
 - Buildings can be viewed as a distributed energy resources (as a battery).
 - Participate in the market to mitigate the uncertainty from the renewables.

DATA

- **Sensors**
 - All sorts of data, how do you use it?
 - Protect it?
 - Who owns the data?
- **Green Button Initiative**
 - Consumer data access

GREEN BUTTON

- <http://www.greenbuttondata.org>



RESEARCH


VOLTRON

- An intelligent agent platform for the smart grid
 - Opensource
 - Gaining a lot of traction in smart buildings
 - Provides a framework for decentralized cooperative decision making
- More info here
 - <http://gridoptics.pnnl.gov/VOLTTRON/>

MY RESEARCH: IMPACT OF CYBER EVENTS

- Smart Buildings can serve as Distributed Energy Resources (DERs)
- Problem: There have not been reliability studies: the impact of uncertainties on the performance:
 - Uncertainties introduced from (i) communication network and (ii) random failures in DERs
- Goal: Quantify the impact of close coupling of cyber and physical components on
 - load DERs
 - system-wide performance

STRUCTURE



FORMULATION

- The dynamics of DERs including local controllers can be captured by generalized battery models.
 - ▶ Commercial buildings HVAC system [1]
 - ▶ Thermostatically controlled loads (TCL): although one TCL can be only operated in ON/OFF mode; a set of TCLs can respond to continuous command signal (i.e., have a continuous thermal model). [2]
- Generalized battery model (atomic model)

$$\begin{aligned}\dot{x}_i(t) &= -a_i x_i(t) - u_i(t) + w_i(t); \\ -C_i &\leq x_i(t) \leq C_i, \quad -\underline{n}_i \leq u_i(t) \leq \bar{n}_i,\end{aligned}$$

for $i = 1, 2, \dots, n$, where $w_i(t)$ represents the external disturbance. $u_i(t)$ is the command signal from the aggregator to DER i . $x_i(t)$ is the DER dynamic state, also called state of charge (SoC) of the battery, related to temperature for TCL.

AGGREGATOR CONTROL

- We adopt the same control mechanism as AGC. We denote $u(t)$ as a control state, and its evolution is governed by

$$\dot{u}(t) = c(r(t) - \sum_{i=1}^n p_i(t));$$

c is a tuning parameter, we choose it to be $\frac{1}{\Delta t}$ (Δt is the time interval of aggregate control) so that the mismatch is quickly compensated in the following control cycle.

- Because of the fast response of DERs. We assume no dynamics on the power supported by DERs, i.e., $p_i(t) = u_i(t)$ under normal condition.

$$\dot{u}(t) = c(r(t) - \sum_{i=1}^n \eta_i u_i(t));$$


- Then, the command signal to each DER:

$$u_i(t) = \beta_i u(t).$$


In terms of uncertain sources

- communication network
 - ▶ communication delays
 - ▶ failures (e.g., packet drops, permanent component failure)
- DER
 - ▶ random failures in DER local controllers and other hardware
 - ▶ random DER external disturbance (e.g., building occupancy, solar radiation)
- random failures in the aggregator computing platform

In terms of modeling: stochastic hybrid model



TWO-UNIT TWO MODE CASE





Parameters are adopted from [1, 2].



| | | | | | |
|------------------------|---------------------|------------------------|--------------------|-----------|-----------|
| $a_1 [s^{-1}]$ | $C_1 [kW \cdot s]$ | $a_2 [s^{-1}]$ | $C_2 [kW \cdot s]$ | β_1 | β_2 |
| 1.003×10^{-4} | 8356 | 6.944×10^{-5} | 14400 | 0.5 | 0.5 |
| $\lambda_1 [s^{-1}]$ | $\gamma_1 [s^{-1}]$ | $r(t) [kW]$ | | | |
| 0.01 | 0.1 | 1 | | | |

TWO-UNIT TWO MODE CASE

Mean and variance of DER 1's SoC



Mean and standard deviation of total power support



THANK YOU!

- Thank You!