

ERDC-CERL Microgrids at Fixed Installations: Security and Economics


Melanie Johnson
ERDC-CERL

TCIPG Seminar
2 March 2012




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US Army Corps of Engineers
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
Engineer Research and Development Center

2500 ERDC Team Members



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Army R&D Organizations



Microgrid Technology


An islandable dynamic power distribution system capable of optimizing multiple power generation assets and loads through advanced controls and communication.

- Two modes of operation: grid-tied and islanded
- Advanced Control Systems
 - ▶ System stability
 - ▶ Economic optimization
 - ▶ Distributed for graceful degradation
 - ▶ Control techniques accommodate reduced “inertia”
- Dynamic and reconfigurable distribution enhances reliability and energy security



Army Microgrid Motivation

- DoD Policy Goals
 - ▶ EISA 2007, EPLA 2005, Ex. Order 13514
- Energy Security
 - ▶ Army Energy Security Implementation Strategy
 - ▶ Surety, Survivability, Supply, Sufficiency, and Sustainability
- Renewables Integration
 - ▶ Economic Optimization
 - ▶ Islanded Operation
- Evolving Energy Market Participation
 - ▶ Demand Response, Peak Shaving
 - ▶ Real Time Pricing
 - ▶ PHEV, BEV Integration



Policy Expansion

- Net-Zero Pilot Installations Identified
- Army Energy Security Implementation Strategy
- EO 13514
- Renewable Energy Handbook for Installations
- AR 420-1, Army Facilities Management
- ESPC and UESC
- Energy Independence and Security Act 2007
- Army Energy and Water Campaign Plan for Installations
- Sec. Army Memo Designation of Senior Official - EO 13423
- Army Energy Conservation
- Army Sustainable Design and Development Policy
- Army Petroleum Reduction Strategy
- DOD 4500.36-R Authorization of Acquisition of Vehicles
- IDG Compliance and MILCON Transformation
- Sec. Def. Memo on 13423
- EO 13423
- Army Directive Reducing SUVs
- Army Green Procurement Guide
- Sustainable Management of Waste in Construction
- Army Policy SPIRT to LEED
- DODI 4170.11
- Installation Energy Goals
- Sec. Def. Memo on Fuel Conservation
- Energy Policy Act 2005
- Army Energy Strategy for Installations
- Army Strategy for the Environment
- AR-58-1 Management of Motor Vehicles
- Army Policy SPIRT
- EO 13150
- Army Policy Sustainable Design and Development
- EO 13031

Army Goals:

- ▶ 9 NZE Installations by 2020
- ▶ 25 NZE Installations by 2030

▶ Fossil Fuel Energy Reduction: 55% in 2010 → 100% in 2030

▶ 25% renewable energy by 2025

▶ 30% better energy consumption in new (“If cost effective”)

▶ 7.5% renewable energy by 2013

- ▲ Executive Order
- ▲ Laws and Statutes
- ▲ DOD Guidance
- ▲ Army Guidance

Slide created by Melanie Johnson, 2011

1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010

Microgrid Scalability



Tactical

99% Islanded, 1%
Grid Tied

10s of kW

Highly Portable



Operational

Forward Operating
Bases

100s of kW

Power Sharing



Installation

99% Grid Tied, 1%
Islanded

10s of MW

Flexible Distribution

Microgrid Scalability






Renewable Sources

Energy Storage

FF Generation

Grid



Mission Critical Loads

Mission Priority Loads

Electrified NTVs



Determining a Microgrid

Energy Security Assessment

- Identify Critical Mission Loads
- Identify Critical Infrastructure Supporting CMLs
- Identify Risk and Mitigations

Islanding Plan

- Select Subset of Critical Infrastructure to Island
- Identify Infrastructure Upgrades Required to Island
- Develop Potential Generation Portfolio

Microgrid Implementation

- Implement Upgrades, Generation Recommendations
- Establish microgrid in phases across the installation



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Microgrid Challenges: Systems of Systems Integration

- **Variety of systems:**
 - ▶ Power Distribution, Industrial Control, Building Automation, Information Network, Utility Communication
- **Interconnecting is a significant challenge.**
 - ▶ Proprietary Protocols/Tools
 - ▶ Legacy Equipment
 - ▶ New vulnerabilities (network connectivity)
- **Standards can mitigate this challenge.**
 - ▶ NIST/SGIP
 - ▶ DHS/INL ICS Procurement Language
 - ▶ Roadmaps



Microgrid Challenges: Information Assurance/Cyber Security

- Extensive communication
 - ▶ Energy production
 - ▶ Usage
 - ▶ Pricing data
 - ▶ Protection
- Network connectivity
 - ▶ Installation Network (DIACAP, NEC)
 - ▶ Internet Connection
- New vulnerabilities
 - ▶ Existing SCADA
 - ▶ More sophisticated control devices



Cyber Security Challenges: IT v. Power Systems

Information Technology World	Power Systems World
Equipment refresh every 2 years	Equipment refresh every 20 years (maybe)
Weekly patch/system reboot is no problem	100% uptime requirement
3:00 AM: good time for a virus scan	3:00 AM or 3:00 PM: no “good” time
Implicit assumption: fail-safe means deny	Implicit assumption: fail-safe means allow
Confidentiality – Integrity – Availability	Availability – Integrity – Confidentiality
IT Department	Operations Department

- IT technologies offer both new capabilities and new vulnerabilities to control systems.
- Reconciling these two paradigms is a challenge!



Cyber Security Challenges: Operational Capabilities

- Security measures can impede system operation
 - Particularly in contingency situations
- Control Systems Vendors include known default passwords.
 - Allows easy access:
 - Especially for the good guys in a pinch!
 - ...and especially for malicious intent!
 - Vulnerabilities like this are required for system operation.
- Good security practices can have dramatic operational impact.

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THREAT LEVEL

PRIVACY, CRIME AND SECURITY ONLINE

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NEXT POST

SCADA System's Hard-Coded Password Circulated Online for Years

By Kim Zetter | July 19, 2010 | 5:29 pm | Categories: Cybersecurity

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A sophisticated new piece of malware that targets command-and-control software installed in critical infrastructures uses a known default password that the software maker hard-coded into its system. The password has been available online since at least 2008, when it was posted to product forums in Germany and Russia.

The password protects the database used in Siemens' Sinatic WinCC SCADA system, which runs on Windows



uring facilities to manage critically vulnerable to purposes of sabotage.

ZDNet

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Siemens warns Stuxnet targets of Scada password risk

By Tom Iqbal, ZDNet UK, 20 July 2010 17:09

[Follow](#) @tom_iqbal

Topics: Scada, Stuxnet, Malware, Rootkit, Microsoft, Siemens

NEWS: Siemens has advised its customers not to change the default passwords hard-coded into its WinCC Scada product, even though the Stuxnet malware that exploits the critical infrastructure systems software is circulating in the wild.

Changing the passwords could affect the operations of critical infrastructure organisations such as utility companies and electricity suppliers, according to Siemens.

"We will be publishing customer guidance shortly, but it won't include advice to change default settings as that could impact plant operations," said Siemens spokesman Michael Krampe in a statement on Monday.

The Stuxnet piece of malware, which combines the characteristics of a rootkit, a worm and a Trojan, is currently infecting critical infrastructure systems around the world. It has already hit India, Iran, Indonesia and the US, among other countries.

Sponsored Links

Managing critical, easy to manage, feature-rich storage in the cloud. [www.amazonaws.com](#)

Intel® Cloud

"We will be publishing customer guidance shortly, but it won't include advice to change default settings as that could impact plant operations," said Siemens spokesman Michael Krampe in a statement on Monday.

The Real Question:

Why connect critical military infrastructure to the internet?




Cyber Security and Economics

- Communication with a utility/ISO/RTO facilitates realization of microgrid economic capabilities.
 - ▶ Not just peak-shaving
- Funding for large-scale microgrid projects is scarce.
 - ▶ Alternative financing is desirable.
- Introducing new vulnerabilities largely eliminates the benefits of the microgrid.
 - ▶ Layered defense is needed.



Microgrid Economic Opportunities

- Peak Shaving: Reduce peak demand utilizing resources “inside the fence”
- Demand Response: Reduce demand in response to grid conditions or energy prices
- Energy Arbitrage: Charge batteries (Or EVs) when energy prices are low and discharge batteries when energy prices are high
- Ancillary/Grid Services: Act as grid resource for regulation and/or reserves



Graphic Concept: USDOE 2006



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Microgrid Economic Opportunities



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Microgrid Economic Capabilities

	Peak Shaving	Demand Response	Energy Arbitrage	Ancillary Services	Real time pricing
Prioritized Load Shedding	⚡	⚡		⚡	⚡
Intentional Islanding	⚡	⚡			⚡
Control	⚡	⚡	⚡	⚡	⚡
Communication	⚡	⚡	⚡	⚡	⚡
Renewables Integration	⚡				⚡
Energy Storage	⚡	⚡	⚡	⚡	⚡
Internal Generation	⚡			⚡	⚡

Energy Market Comparison


	Fort Carson	Fort Bliss	Fort Irwin
Peak Shaving (Demand Reduction)	⚡	⚡	⚡
Demand Response		⚡	⚡
Energy Arbitrage			⚡
Ancillary Grid Services			⚡

- **Fort Carson:** Vertically Integrated, no capacity constraints
- **Fort Bliss:** Vertically Integrated, summer capacity constraints
- **Fort Irwin:** Energy Market, expanded opportunity.



Demand Response Simulator

Daily Settlement Totals for July - Fort Irwin



Study funded by IMCOM-W FY2010.




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Demand Response

- Simulator Caveats:
 - ▶ Baseline calculation
 - ▶ Guaranteed bid acceptance
 - ▶ No non-performance penalties
 - ▶ Estimated non-critical loads
 - ▶ No service fees

- Additional Challenges: Need 3rd party aggregator to assume risks of market participation.
- Study led to ESTCP to demonstrate Open ADR protocols at Fort Irwin with Honeywell.





SPIDERS

SMART POWER INFRASTRUCTURE DEMONSTRATION FOR ENERGY RELIABILITY AND SECURITY

SPIDERS JCTD Objectives

▪ **Cyber-security**

- ▶ Layered in-depth defense
- ▶ Information assurance

▪ **Smart Grid Technologies & Applications**

- ▶ Automated load balancing,
- ▶ Two-way communication,
- ▶ Smart-metering,
- ▶ Automatic system re-configuration
- ▶ Demand side management/Load shedding

▪ **Islanded Micro-grid**

- ▶ Entire installation to island
- ▶ Extended continuity of operations
- ▶ Seamless disconnect/reconnect

▪ **Distributed & intermittent renewable sources**

- ▶ Off-grid availability
- ▶ Reduce fossil fuel consumption and carbon boot-print



SPIDERS Participants

- USPACOM, USNORTHCOM, DOE, and DHS



- DOE - 5 Nat'l Labs



- USACE ERDC – Construction Engineering Research Lab (CERL)



- Military Services



- Naval Facilities Engineering Command



- Local Utility Companies



- States of Hawaii & Colorado



JCTD SPIDERS Overview



Phase 1: JB Pearl-Hickam Circuit Level Demonstration

- Renewables
- Storage
- Energy Management

Phase 2: Fort Carson Microgrid

- Large-Scale Renewables
- Vehicle-to-Grid
- Smart Microgrid
- Critical Assets
- CONUS Homeland Defense Demo
- COOP Exercise

Phase 3: Camp Smith Energy Island

- Entire Installation Smart Microgrid
- Islanded Installation
- High Penetration of Renewables
- Demand Side Management
- Redundant Backup Power
- Makana Pahili Hurricane Exercise

Beyond: Transition

- Template for DoD-wide Implementation
- CONOPS
- TTPs
- Training Plans
- DoD Adds Specs to GSA Schedule
- Transition to Commercial Sector
- Transition Cyber Security to Federal Sector and Utilities

Cyber-Security Solution Development

- **Intended End Result of SPIDERS:**
 - First Complete DoD installation with a secure, smart, islandable microgrid
 - Template for DoD-wide installation energy security
- **Technical Manager: U.S. Army ERDC-CERL, Deputy TM: Sandia National Laboratory**

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secure, smart, islandable microgrid
energy security

, Deputy TM: Sandia National Laboratory

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Development


Intended

- First
- Tem
- Technical

andable microgrid

India National Laboratory

The SPIDERS Microgrid at Fort Carson



SPIDERS Microgrid Region

2 MW Solar Array

Phase 2: SPIDERS @ Fort Carson

Loads

- ▶ **Tier 1:** Loads/buildings that are critical to the mission of Fort Carson. 100% served by islanded microgrid.
 - **1.1 MW**
- ▶ **Tier 2:** Loads/buildings that are nice to have, but that can be switched on or off the microgrid at the garrison commander's discretion.
 - **1 MW**
- ▶ **Tier 3:** Loads/buildings that will not be powered during islanded microgrid operation



Phase 2: SPIDERS @ Fort Carson

Generation Assets:

▶ Diesel Generation:

- 4 Generators - 3.225 MW(3.5 MVA)

▶ Renewables:

- 2 MW Solar Array

▶ Energy Storage:

- Smith Electric Vehicles: 440 kWh
- Additional: 500-750 kW for one hour



JCTD SPIDERS Overview



Phase 1: JB Pearl-Hickam Circuit Level Demonstration

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Phase 2: Fort Microgrid

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
Phase 4: Transition

- Template for DoD-wide Installation
- Plans
- Specs to Schedule
- Social Sector
- Cyber
- to Federal and Utilities

Cyber-Sec

- Intended End Result of SPIDERS:
 - First Complete DoD installation
 - Template for DoD-wide installation
- Technical Manager: U.S. Army ERD

SPIDERS Microgrids On Oahu



Phase 3:
Camp Smith

Phase 1:
Joint Base Pearl
Harbor Hickam

JCTD SPIDERS Overview



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- Renewables
- Storage
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Phase 2: Fort Carson Microgrid

- Large-Scale Renewables
- Vehicle-to-Grid
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- CONUS Homeland Defense Demo
- COOP Exercise

Beyond: Transition

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- Transition to Commercial Sector
- Transition Cyber Security to Federal Sector and Utilities

Cyber-Security Solutions

- **Intended End Result of SPIDERS:**
 - First Complete DoD installation with a security solution
 - Template for DoD-wide installation energy security
- **Technical Manager:** U.S. Army ERDC-CERL, Deputy

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Cyber-Security Solution Development

- **Intended End Result of SPIDERS:**
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Fort Sill Field-Scale Microgrid Demonstration



- Generation:
 - ▶ 2 – 210kW Natural Gas Generators
 - ▶ 30 kW PV
 - ▶ 2.4 kW Wind
 - ▶ 500 kWh/250 kW ZnBr Flow Battery
- Loads: Chiller Loop
- Features:
 - ▶ Adjustable trip-curve breakers
 - ▶ Microgrid Interface Switch



- Demonstration:
 - ▶ Seamless transition
 - ▶ Extended islanded operation

Nextek DC Power System


- Expect efficiency gains through eliminating multiple AC/DC conversions
- 24V DC Power Distribution
- Generation:
 - ▶ 7 kW PV
 - ▶ Energy Storage
 - ▶ Power Grid
- Load:
 - ▶ Fluorescent Lighting with DC Ballasts
 - ▶ Electronics



Other Projects

- Fort Bliss Microgrid Demonstration:

- ▶ Dining Facility supported by existing backup diesel, high penetration renewables, and energy storage.
- ▶ Partnership with Lockheed Martin
- ▶ ESTCP Funded



- OpenADR Protocol Demonstration:

- ▶ Pilot tariff and protocol demonstration at Fort Irwin, CA for automated demand response
- ▶ Partnership with Honeywell
- ▶ ESTCP funded



Wrap Up

- Microgrids offer higher reliability and efficiency through the use of advanced control and communication.
- Control and communication make it possible to have substantial and autonomous market interaction.
- Overlaying communication network on critical infrastructure introduces new vulnerabilities and culture clashes.



Questions?



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