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# LESSONS LEARNED IN SMART GRID CYBER SECURITY

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# Agenda

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- Smart Grid Cyber Security Challenges
- IT OT Traditional Integration Challenges
- More Interconnectivity, Distribution and Access Points
- Cyber Security Vs. Compliance
- Smart Grid Vendor Management Challenges
- Software Assurance
- Other Observations
- Positive directions - things are changing

# Smart Grid Cyber Security Issues and Challenges

- System complexity is growing through expanding interconnectivity of systems and the extension of the electronic perimeter to new grid components and participants
  - Increasingly distributed assets (AMI, HAN)
- Lots of legacy investments that need to be secured along side newer, unproven technologies
  - Security upgrades to legacy systems are limited by inherent limitations of the equipment and architectures
- Operations and control networks previously thought to be inherently protected through private networks, serial connections and proprietary protocols are increasingly more vulnerable as networks are connected

# Smart Grid Cyber Security Issues and Challenges

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- SCADA vulnerabilities and malware (Vendor access, USBs, disgruntled employees)
- Aurora Project proves that control networks can be penetrated
- Cyber threats are unpredictable and evolve faster than the sector's ability to develop and deploy countermeasures
- Threat, vulnerability, incidents and mitigation information sharing is insufficient among government and industry

# Smart Grid Cyber Security Issues and Challenges

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- Increasing concern for privacy issues
- Weak business case for cyber security investment by industry
- Regulatory uncertainty in energy sector cyber security
- DOE SGIG investments
  - Provided a boost to cyber security awareness and enhancement, but what is next?
- Business drivers to change traditional IT / OT boundaries

# IT OT Integration Challenges

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- Typically do not work together
- OT views the corporate network as vulnerable and resources inadequate
- OT networks and systems have different performance and reliability requirements
- Differing security architectures and risk management goals
- OT legacy systems challenging to support, upgrade and integrate
- Multiple support systems that do not integrate or interoperate – change management, ticketing , tracking and reporting, configuration management, patch management, audit and monitoring

# New Technology Challenges Traditional Approaches

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- More Interconnectivity, distribution and access points
- Mobile devices
- Wireless network security
- Encryption and authentication
- Distributed key management
  - Need a secure network for key management
- Integrated and active monitoring

# Cyber Security Vs. Compliance

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- Culture of compliance, culture of security – Compatible goals?
- Many utilities didn't have a centralized security function prior to NERC CIP
  - Security modeled after NERC CIP – Process not technology oriented
- Risk management and security governance programs are not in place
- Getting management's attention and building the business case for cyber security after NERC CIP



# Smart Grid Vendor Management Challenges

- Without skilled resources, many utilities rely on vendors to configure device security
  - Vendors do not know utilities cyber security requirements and do not configure to implement a defined policy or integrated architecture
  - No linkage from vendor to vendor – Defense in depth?
- Vendors ship products with little or no security turned on by default
- Rush to bring products to market without testing to ensure that they actually work as advertised or integrate
- Utilities typically don't have test environments and rely on vendors to test
- Technology and standards continue to evolve
- Vendors won't share system certifications or provide proof of testing

# Software Assurance

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- Secure software development
  - Integrated systems testing
  - Testing code from third-party vendors
  - Code testing
- Vendor mergers and use of third-parties
  - Built in backdoors for troubleshooting
- Performance/acceptance testing of new control and communication solutions is difficult without disrupting operations

# Other Smart Grid Deployment Observations

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- Smart grids inherent goal to provide consumers with more information to make informed decisions regarding energy consumption
  - But what about concerns for the protection and sharing of usage information and privacy information?
- Loss of traditional physical security perimeters with more distributed assets requiring physical and logical security to work together
- Aging infrastructure – many legacy smart grid assets are not being upgraded or patched
- Outsourced hardware and software support – many partners
- Anti-virus problem still not solved – integrated solutions and management
- Current cyber security skill set and ability to recruit
- Incident Management continues to evolve and integrate

# Positive Directions – Things are Changing

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- Beginning to see a risk management Vs. pure compliance approach to security within the utilities
- Government, vendors, research and universities and utilities are working together
- Practical, business-oriented metrics and measurement mechanisms are being developed and used
  - Increased visibility and understanding of current state and challenges, and to facilitate prioritization
- Beginning to describe security requirements and incidents in language more accessible to management and more aligned with core utility values and business drivers, including safety and reliability
- More attention to Operational-side issues